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The  so-called  rigor–relevance  gap  appears  unbridgeable  in  the  classical  view  of 
organization science, which is based on the physical sciences’ model. Constructivist scholars 
have also pointed out a certain inadequacy of this model of science for organization research, 
but they have not offered an explicit, alternative model of science.  
Responding  to  this  lack,  this  paper  brings  together  the  two  separate  paradigmatic 
perspectives of constructivist epistemologies and of organizational design science, and shows 
how  they  could  jointly  constitute  the  ingredients  of  a  constructivism-founded  scientific 
paradigm for organization research. Further, the paper highlights that, in this constructivist 
view of organizational design science, knowledge can be generated and used in ways that are 
mutually enriching for academia and practice.  
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“The  object  of  all  science,  whether  natural  science  or 
psychology, is to co-ordinate our experiences and to bring 
them into a logical order.”  
Einstein, 1955, p.1 
 
 
This  contribution  to  the  on-going  discussions  about  organization  science  paradigms 
(Pfeffer 1993; Cannella and Paetzold 1994; McKelvey 1997; Weick 1999) aims at setting 
forth the basic ingredients of a constructivism-founded scientific paradigm
2. This paradigm 
has the advantage of providing a framework in which the rigor – relevance gap, which has 
been argued to be unbridgeable in the classical view of organization science (Kieser  and 
Leiner 2009), can be overcome. 
 Constructivist perspectives have played an important role in what is sometimes referred 
to as the organization science paradigm war (McKelvey 1997). Despite the abundance of 
research done within these perspectives, nowadays, constructivist research about organization 
is faced with a number of issues that impede further progress. The proliferation of different 
varieties of constructivist perspectives (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Piaget 1967; Glasersfeld 
1984, 2001, 2005; Astley 1985; Guba and Lincoln 1989, 1998; Cannella and Paetzold 1994; 
Le  Moigne  1995,  2001,  2002;  Mir  and  Watson  2000;  Charmaz  2003,  2006)  which  have 
different scopes and which rest on potentially different foundational assumptions generate 
enormous  confusion  which  is  not  favorable  to  knowledge  development  in  constructivist 
epistemologies. More fundamentally, while constructivist scholars have regularly pointed out 
the inadequacy of the physical sciences as a model for organization research (Cannella and 
Paetzold 1994), they have not offered an explicit, alternative model of science consistent with 
constructivist epistemologies. This is most probably because of the widespread, implicit belief 
among scholars that science has to be founded on positivist or realist epistemologies. Indeed, 
any conception of science, when it is viewed as a continuing effort to develop an organized 
body  of  knowledge  (through  disciplined  research)  about  the  world  in  which  humans  are 
embedded, needs to be associated with an epistemology. However, this epistemology does not 
necessarily need to be a positivist or a realist one (Glasersfeld 2001).   
This absence of an alternative model of science well suited to the study of organizational 
phenomena  delays  the  possible  emergence  of  an  alternative  scientific  paradigm  for 
organization research founded on a constructivist epistemological paradigm. This situation 
generates  numerous  unanswered  questions  about  constructivism-founded  research.  What 
might  the  term  scientific  mean  in  constructivism-founded  organization  research?  How  to 
conceive  of  knowledge  generalization  and  justification  in  a  constructivism-founded 
organization  science  without  an  explicit  model  for  this  science?  How  would  use  of  the 
knowledge be affected by its elaboration in this scientific paradigm? 
A fairly separate stream of works concern the development of design sciences (Hatchuel 
2001;  Romme  2003;  van  Aken  2004,  2005,  2007;  March  and  Storey  2008),  also  labeled 
sciences of design (Le Moigne 2002; Van Gigch 2002) and sciences for design (Jelinek et al. 
2008). These notions of science are explicitly developed within the framework of Simon’s 
(1969) sciences of the artificial, rather than within the sciences of nature framework. The 
conceptualization of these sciences is still nascent but has recently gained strong momentum 
in  organization  research.  For  instance,  an  organizational  design  science,  also  labeled 
                                                 
2 The term paradigm is used in the sense of “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on, 
shared by the members of a given community.” (Kuhn 1970: 175) In this definition, “beliefs, techniques, and so 
on”, can concern any kind of subject matter such as epistemology, science, or methodology. This paper deals 










































organization  design science  (Mohrman  2007;  Jelinek  et  al.  2008),  is progressively  taking 
shape. So far, contributions about organizational design science have concentrated more on 
methodological  aspects  (Hatchuel  2001;  JABS  2007;  OS  2008;  MISQ  2008)  than  on  the 
epistemological contexts in which it could fruitfully develop.  
This  paper’s  contribution  is  to  bring  together  these  two  separate  paradigmatic 
perspectives  of  constructivist  epistemologies  and  of  organizational  design  science,  and  to 
show how they could jointly constitute the ingredients of a constructivism-founded scientific 
paradigm for organization research. It is also to underscore that in this view of organization 
science the so-called rigor – relevance gap, which has been argued to be unbridgeable in 
conventional organization science (Kieser and Leiner 2009), can be overcome.  
The paper is organized into two parts. The first part shows that Simon’s (1969, 1996) 
conception  of  the  sciences  of  the  artificial  is  consistent  with  radical  constructivism 
(Glasersfeld 1984, 2001, 2005; Riegler 2001) as further conceptualized by Le Moigne (1995, 
2001) under the label teleological constructivist epistemological paradigm. It then argues that 
bringing together these two paradigmatic perspectives offers the beginnings of an alternative 
scientific paradigm for constructivist organization research. The second part examines issues 
of  generation  and  use  of  academic  knowledge  in  this  alternative  scientific  paradigm, 
anchoring the discussion in the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz 
2003, 2006) as well as in methods developed in the design sciences (Pawson and Tilley 1997; 
Van Aken 2004; JABS 2007; Denyer et al. 2008).  
Core Ingredients of a Constructivism-Founded Scientific Paradigm 
Mir and Watson’s (2000) review of constructivist studies reveals the dynamism and the 
import of constructivist reflection in organization research over the last thirty  years. This 
dynamism  has  been  accompanied  by  the  emergence  of  a  wide  variety  of  kinds  of 
constructivism  (Berger  and  Luckmann  1966;  Piaget  1967;  Glasersfeld  1984,  2001,  2005; 
Astley 1985; Guba and Lincoln 1989, 1998; Cannella and Paetzold 1994; Le Moigne 1995; 
Mir and Watson 2000; Charmaz 2003, 2006). Despite this variety Mir and Watson (2000) 
found that constructivist scholars share a number of beliefs.  However, in order to constitute 
the basic ingredients of a constructivism-founded organization science these shared beliefs 
need to be further specified and supplemented. In particular, the underlying epistemological 
paradigm  needs  to  be  explicitly  defined,  and  constructivists’  shared  beliefs  need  to  be 
complemented  by  an  explicit  model  of  science  that  is  well  suited  for  the  study  of 
organizations and consistent with the specified epistemological paradigm.  
The Teleological Constructivist Epistemological Paradigm: Foundations, Advantages, Outcome 
Currently there are two different constructivist epistemological paradigms, namely Guba 
and  Lincoln’s  (1989,  1998)  Constructivist  Epistemological  Paradigm,  and  Glasersfeld’s 
(1984, 2001, 2005) Radical Constructivism, which was further conceptualized by Le Moigne 
(1995, 2001, 2002) under the label Teleological Constructivist Epistemological Paradigm. 
Table 1 summarizes these two paradigms’ main founding assumptions. Inspired by Guba and 
Lincoln (1998), it is arranged in three rows which, according to these authors, reflect the three 
basic questions of epistemology, namely: 
1)  The ontological question which asks: “What is there to be known?” 
2)  The epistemological question which asks: “What is the relationship of the knower to 
the known (or the knowable)?” 











































------ Insert Table 1 about here ------ 
This table reveals that the two constructivist epistemological paradigms strictly agree on 
only one founding assumption, that which postulates that, even though the inquirer and the 
phenomenon  under  inquiry  are  distinguishable  from  one  another,  in  the  knowledge 
elaboration  process  they  cannot  be  separated  in  the  following  sense:  the  inquirer  cannot 
rationally know such a thing as an independent, objective world that stands apart from his/her 
experience of that world. This assumption, which is precisely the basic founding assumption 
of phenomenology, has important consequences. It implies that the usual separation between 
ontology and epistemology disappears in constructivist paradigms, a phenomenon that the 
dashed line between the ontological and epistemological levels in Table 1 is meant to reflect 
(Guba and Lincoln 1998). This unfeasibility of separating ontology and epistemology induced 
radical —and teleological —constructivists to take an agnostic stance about ontology (Riegler 
2001).  Although  they  do  not  deny  the  existence  of  a  real  world,  they  do  not  make  any 
pronouncements on it either. In particular, they do not postulate any founding assumption on 
the  possible  nature  of  reality.  This  endows  the  teleological  constructivist  epistemological 
paradigm  with  a  crucial  property:  for  the  sake  of  framing  a  particular  research  project, 
teleological constructivist scholars have the possibility of taking any beliefs concerning the 
possible  nature  of  the  world  (that  are  consistent  with  their  experience  of  that  world)  as 
working assumptions
3. The only condition is that these working assumptions be explicitly 
stated  and  consistent  with  the  paradigm’s  founding  assumptions.  As  a  consequence,  the 
teleological  constructivist  epistemological  paradigm  includes  as  special  cases  any 
phenomenology-based  epistemological  paradigm  which  posits  ontological  founding 
assumptions.  
In  particular,  researchers  can  take  as  a  working  ontological  assumption,  one  that  is 
frequently  made  in  interpretive  research  which  considers  that  human  activity  is patterned 
(Yanow  2006).  As  a  matter  of  fact,  since  interpretive  methods  are  grounded  in 
phenomenology and hermeneutics, research conducted with these methods can rightfully be 
epistemologically anchored in the teleological constructivist epistemological paradigm.  
As another example of ontological working assumptions, researchers can also take Guba 
and Lincoln’s position which states that: “The ontological question is answered by adherents 
of  the  constructivist  paradigm  by  asserting  that  there  exist  multiple  socially  constructed 
realities not governed by any natural laws, causal or otherwise: a relativist ontology. These 
constructions are devised by individuals as they attempt to make sense of their experiences, 
which it should be recalled, are always interactive in nature.” (Guba and Lincoln 1989: 86) 
Incidentally, this quote reveals a weakness in Guba and Lincoln’s discourse: they mingle what 
pertains to the epistemological realm—the constructions evoked in the last sentence—and 
what pertains to the ontological realm—the socially constructed realities evoked in the first 
sentence.  
The  teleological  constructivist  epistemological  paradigm  also  permits  more 
methodological possibilities than that according to Guba and Lincoln. Indeed, in the latter, 
only hermeneutical dialectical methods of inquiry are eligible. In the former, any method, 
provided it is used in an interpretive perspective (i.e. in search of understanding and meaning 
rather  than  solely  causal  explanations)  is  eligible  to  generate  knowledge.  Hence  the 
teleological constructivist epistemological paradigm appears more open than that according to 
Guba and Lincoln both at the ontological and at the methodological level. 
Because  of  the  greater  openness  of  the  teleological  constructivist  epistemological 
paradigm over that according to Guba and Lincoln, the reflection and the discussion of this 
                                                 
3 A working assumption is an assumption made in a research project, which will be accepted as stated rather than 










































paper will henceforth be anchored in the teleological constructivist epistemological paradigm. 
In this epistemological paradigm, knowledge is explicitly accepted as provisional. It has the 
status of plausible hypothesis which fits experience (Le Moigne 1995; Glasersfeld 2001). This 
epistemological  paradigm’s  agnosticism  together  with  the  status  of  knowledge  in  this 
paradigm  endow  the  elaboration  of  knowledge  within  this  paradigm  with  a  remarkable 
feature,  namely  the  capability  of  thoughtfully  incorporating  knowledge  that  has  been 
developed in other epistemological paradigms. 
The  converse  appears  problematic  because  of  knowledge’s  explicit  status  in  the 
epistemological  paradigm—that  of  plausible  hypothesis  that  fits  experience—and  because 
knowledge, in this epistemological paradigm, needs not be expressed in the form of falsifiable 
statements. As will be further detailed in the second part of the paper, the status bestowed 
upon  knowledge  in  this  paradigm  also  has  consequences  on  the  way  knowledge  about 
organization developed in this paradigm can be put to use.  
Constructivist Scholars’ Shared Beliefs and the Teleological Constructivist Epistemological 
Paradigm (TECP) 
In their review of constructivist works Mir and Watson (2000) found that constructivist 
scholars share six fundamental beliefs (see Table 2), among which is the founding assumption 
common to the teleological constructivist epistemological paradigm (TCEP henceforth) and 
that according to Guba and Lincoln. 
------ Insert Table 2 about here ------ 
A close look at these shared beliefs reveals that they are consistent with the TCEP, except 
for  the  way  in  which  the  last  one  is  formulated.  It  states  that:  “Constructivism  has been 
conceptualized  as  a  methodology.”  (Mir  and  Watson  2000:  944)  This  shows  that,  unlike 
teleological  constructivists  (Le  Moigne  1995;  Glasersfeld  2001),  Mir  and  Watson  do  not 
distinguish between epistemology and methodology. Such an attitude, which is frequent in 
organization  research,  reduces  epistemological  reflection  to  a  methodological  one.  Yet 
epistemology is concerned with the origin, nature and limits of human knowledge (Guba and 
Lincoln 1989), while methodology specifically deals with methods, techniques and rules for 
developing  knowledge.  Hence  methodology  is  just  one  aspect  of  epistemology.  Piaget’s 
(1967) concise definitions clarify their differences. Indeed, he defines methodology as the 
study of the constitution of knowledge, and epistemology as the study of the constitution of 
valuable  knowledge.  By  not  limiting  valuable  knowledge  to  mean  knowledge  validated 
according to the so-called scientific method, Piaget’s definition of epistemology enriches and 
opens the conception of scientific knowledge to include knowledge whose value is assessed 
differently, in particular knowledge that is legitimized in epistemological paradigms other 
than the positivist and realist ones. 
It is noteworthy that Mir and Watson’s (2000) own conception of constructivism differs 
from both the teleological constructivist epistemological paradigm and that according to Guba 
and Lincoln. Indeed, while the teleological constructivist epistemological paradigm does not 
make any ontological founding assumption and Guba and Lincoln make a relativist ontology 
assumption, Mir and Watson improperly make a realist ontology assumption. This added to 
the confusion around constructivism and triggered a famous controversy (Kwan and Tsang 
2001). 
Constructivist scholars share yet another belief that, surprisingly, Mir and Watson (2000) 
did not set forth: they consider that the classical physical sciences’ model does not represent 
an adequate model for organization research (Cannella and Paetzold 1994). However, it is not 
sufficient to contest the monopoly of the sciences of nature model to make up a scientific 










































an explicit, alternative model to replace it. The next section will argue that Simon’s (1969) 
conceptualization  of  the  sciences  of  the  artificial  is  consistent  with  a  constructivist 
epistemology and well suited for organization research. Hence it constitutes a good candidate 
for the missing model of science for constructivist research. 
Bringing together the Sciences of the Artificial and the Teleological Constructivist 
Epistemological Paradigm (TCEP) 
Unlike  some  of  Simon’s  well-known  contributions  in  economics,  psychology, 
organization science, political sciences or artificial intelligence, his conception of the sciences 
of the artificial has diffused slowly. This most unwonted labeling of “artificial” probably did 
not help
4. Indeed, the term artificial strikes one as contrary to the notion of science. It has a 
negative connotation. It evokes physical artifacts or artificial intelligence, while for Simon an 
artifact is any system, such as an organization, perceived as being shaped by some human 
intentions and embedded in an environment in which it evolves.  
An Archetype of Science Alternative to that of the Sciences of Nature 
Simon’s (1969) idea for conceptualizing the sciences of the artificial originated from the 
following considerations. The world inhabited by humans shows evidence of human artifice 
almost everywhere: for instance, gardens, plowed fields, the very species upon which humans 
depend for their food. Two specific properties of artifacts render them inappropriate for being 
studied within the archetype of the sciences of nature: their being shaped by human intentions 
and their contingency to their environment. Because of the omnipresence of artifacts and their 
important roles in the environments in which humans live, it is crucial to develop knowledge 
about  the  functioning  and  evolution  of  actual  artifacts.  It  is  also  important  to  develop 
knowledge for the design and implementation of future artifacts which would have certain 
desired properties. Considering that the archetype of the sciences of nature does not offer an 
adequate framework for studying artifacts, Simon engaged in the conceptualization of another 
archetype of science that would be dedicated to the study of artifacts of any kind. He named it 
the sciences of the artificial. His conceptualization relies on the development of appropriate 
means for modeling and understanding artifacts, i.e. phenomena in which human intentions as 
well as so-called natural laws are embodied. These means can take the form of notions or 
principles as diverse as symbols system, representation, problem space (see Box 1), heuristic 
search, procedural and substantive rationality, planning without final goal, and the principle of 
intelligent  action.  Then,  using  these  means,  scholars  can  develop  knowledge  relevant  for 
understanding existing artifacts and/or for designing and implementing new artifacts having 
intended properties.  
------ Insert Box 1 about here ------ 
In  Simon’s  conception,  the  sciences  of  the  artificial  permit  integration  of  knowledge 
stemming from the sciences of nature, whenever this appears relevant. For instance, his study 
of  organizational  decision-making  explicitly  took  into  account  human  bounded  cognitive 
capabilities (Simon 1957). Hence, because of the way Simon conceived the sciences of the 
artificial, the union of the scopes of the sciences of nature and of the sciences of the artificial 
appears to cover all phenomena that scholars from any field may contemplate investigating. In 
addition, since an ever increasing number of phenomena are considered as being influenced, 
either  deliberately  or  not,  by  human  intentional  actions,  the  scope  of  the  sciences  of  the 
                                                 
4 Much as the label “radical” does not help convey the agnostic character of radical constructivism. Hence my 
preference for the label “teleological constructivist epistemological paradigm” (Le Moigne 2001), which does 
not have any specific connotation besides its  meaning  which emphasizes the dependence of the knowledge 










































artificial seems to be progressively enlarging. For instance, it henceforth encompasses the 
sciences of climate since researchers now view global climate evolution as being influenced 
by human activity while, until the mid-20th century, they considered it as human-independent.  
The Consistency of Simon’s Conception with the TCEP 
I  will  now  show  that  Simon’s  epistemological  position  at  the  time  he  started 
conceptualizing  the  sciences  of  the  artificial  does  not  contradict  the  TCEP’s  founding 
assumptions recalled in Table 1, even though, in 1947—hence years before—in a specific 
context, he explicitly stated that he was studying decision theory within the philosophical 
perspective of logical positivism.  
Both the sciences of the artificial and the TCEP place empirical investigation of human 
experience at the core of the knowledge process (Glasersfeld 2001; Simon 1977a, 1977b, 
1989). In addition, at least from the ‘70s on
5, Simon’s position has not contradicted the core 
founding assumption shared by constructivist scholars, which states that an inquirer cannot 
rationally know such a thing as an independent, objective world that stands apart from his/her 
experience. Indeed, in his investigations of human problem-solving processes, Simon used to 
ask participants to think aloud while solving a problem that was given to them (Simon 1977a). 
This suggests that in developing knowledge on thought processes Simon relied on human 
experience and its expression in natural language, which is a particular form of symbolic 
construction.  Simon’s  quotes  in  Box  1  also  reveal  that,  as  in  the  TCEP,  the  notions  of 
representation and fit are central in his conception of the sciences of the artificial. For Simon, 
the substratum of human reasoning consists of representations. In particular, during design 
processes, models can offer representations of artifacts which do not yet exist (Simon 1969). 
As is the case for any and all artifacts, representations depend both on the goals towards 
which they are constructed and the specific context of this construction—in particular the 
availability of memorized representations functionally fitted to the problem at hand. Newly-
created representations and solutions to problems are integrated into the system of previously 
memorized  representations.  This  has  two  consequences:  first,  it  enlarges  the  individual’s 
subsequent problem-space creation capabilities; second, according to Simon’s view of the 
adaptability of symbol systems recalled in Box 1, the integration of new representations may 
induce an adaptation of the previously memorized representations. Hence, Simon’s view of 
knowledge construction is consistent with the teleological constructivist assumption which 
states that knowledge construction is context and goal-dependent, and furthermore, that new 
knowledge may induce modifications to the prior knowledge that served to build it. 
Consequently,  it  seems  legitimate  to  conclude  that  Simon’s  conceptualization  of  the 
sciences of the artificial is consistent with the foundational assumptions of the TCEP. Even 
though,  to  my  knowledge,  he  never  stated  it  overtly  nor  did  he  specifically  address  this 
question. Rather, he used the phrase “empirical epistemology” (Simon 1989) to describe his 
specific epistemological positioning in which empirical investigation played a central role.  
-------- Insert Table 3 about here -------- 
Table 3 aims to illustrate, using references to published works, that there is no necessary 
correspondence  between  archetypes  of  science  and  epistemological  paradigms.  It  cites 
Maturana’s (2000) constructivist works in biology to show that even though the sciences of 
nature developed principally in association with a positivist epistemological paradigm until 
the  mid-twentieth  century,  research  in  the  sciences  of  nature  can  develop  in  either 
                                                 
5 Simon’s position seems to have progressively evolved to philosophical pragmatism (Simon 1977a, 1977b) and 
to what he called empirical epistemology (Simon 1989), which places human experience at its core. Indeed, in 
1977, he stated that “when man describes [an ambiguous stimulus], he depicts not some external reality, but 
himself” (1977a: 2), and also expressed his regrets that: “we are accustomed to think of the scientist as observing 










































epistemological  paradigm.  In  the  lower  right-hand  quadrant,  it  cites  works  explicitly 
developed  in  the  TCEP  (Le  Moigne  2002;  Van  Gigch  2002),  which  concern  a particular 
exemplar of the sciences of the artificial on which we are going to focus now, the sciences of 
design—also known as design sciences. 
Design Sciences: Sciences of the Artificial’s Most Advanced Explicit Exemplar  
Organizations are often  depicted as artifacts initially founded by some individuals for 
some  purpose,  in  a  particular  context  that  imposes  a  number  of  constraints  on  their 
functioning,  rather  than  as  objects  created  by  Nature—like  the  planets  in  the  universe. 
Organizations viewed as artifacts have no dispensation allowing them to ignore or violate the 
so-called laws of nature, which for instance put constraints on the physical and physiological 
capabilities of organization members.  
Organizations have further specific properties stemming from the fact that they involve 
human  beings.  Indeed,  human  beings  are  usually  considered  as  emotional  and  physical 
creatures with desires, tangible bonds, attachments and affiliations to communities. They are 
also  considered  as  having  other  distinctive  capabilities  such  as  intentional  behavior, 
consciousness, reflexivity (Weick 1999), creativity, and the capability to interpret situations 
as  well  as  that  of  contesting  interpretations  (Yanow  2006).  Consequently,  organizational 
phenomena can be viewed as being shaped by the intentional acts of socialized human beings 
who are capable of designing intelligent actions for reaching their goals. The term “shaped” is 
taken to mean influenced rather than determined: there is no guarantee that the decisions 
reached  will  correspond  to  any  overall  goal  (Simon  1964).  All  these  properties  render 
conceptualizing organization science as a science of the artificial relevant. 
Simon  emphasized  the  central  role  of  design  within  the  sciences  of  the  artificial  and 
initiated the conceptualization of a science of design as an exemplar of the sciences of the 
artificial. It is from this specific exemplar that the sciences of the artificial have developed the 
most, under various generic names such as sciences of design (Le Moigne 2001, 2002; Van 
Gigch 2002), design sciences (Hatchuel 2001; Romme 2003; Van Aken 2004, 2005; Tranfield 
2006; JABS 2007; Denyer et al. 2008; OS 2008; MISQ 2008), or sciences for design (Jelinek 
et al. 2008).  
The development of these sciences has gained important momentum in the last ten years. 
They have received strong support from the US National Science Foundation which carried 
out a large program on the “Science of design archetype and artifact development” from 2003 
to 2009. Special issues published by three major academic journals in organization research 
(JABS 2007; OS 2008; MISQ 2008) on the topic of design sciences in between 2007 and 2008 
offer complementary signs of this accelerating development.  
Until now, the conceptualization of organization science as a science of the artificial has 
mostly  been  done  in  the  narrower  framework  of  the  design  sciences,  under  the  label 
organizational  design  science  (Mohrman  2007).  It  is  to  this  notion  of  science,  still  in  its 
infancy, that constructivist research about organizations will be connected in the rest of this 
paper,  fostering  an  extension  to  earlier  design  research  theorizing  and  methodological 
developments (Mohrman 2007; JABS 2007; OS 2008; MISQ 2008). Most of this research is 
not explicit enough about its epistemological positioning to be straightforwardly located in 
one row or the other of Table 3. Some like (Van Aken 2004, 2005, 2007; Grandori and 
Furnari 2008) implicitly or explicitly adhere to a positivist or critical realist paradigm. Stances 
taken by others, such as the development of customized syntheses based on research done in 
different epistemological paradigms (Denyer and Tranfield 2006; Denyer et al. 2008), can be 










































like  Romme  (2003)  and  Jelinek  et  al.  (2008),  explicitly  aspire  to  conceptualizing  design 
sciences  as  a  framework  capable  of  integrating  contributions  elaborated  in  different 
epistemological  paradigms.  Finally,  Le  Moigne’s  (2001,  2002)  and  Van  Gigch’s  (2002) 
contributions relative to the sciences of design can definitely be located in Table 3’s lower 
right-hand quadrant.  
Even  though  not  all  contemporary  design  sciences’  scholars  adhere  to  the  TCEP,  the 
arguments developed in the preceding sections provide a number of reasons which jointly 
make  the  archetype  of  the  sciences  of  the  artificial—as  well  as  the  model  of  the  design 
sciences which constitutes an explicit exemplar of this archetype—a worthy candidate for the 
missing model of science in constructivism-founded organization research. These reasons are 
mainly: the consistency of Simon’s conception of the sciences of the artificial with the TCEP; 
the adherence of a growing number of scholars to this archetype of science (at least through 
its  design  sciences’  exemplar);  the  possibility  of  integrating  contributions  developed  in 
different epistemological paradigms, a possibility offered by the TCEP while not offered by 
other epistemological paradigms ; and the aspiration of a number of design sciences’ scholars 
for an epistemology having such an interesting capability.  
In the constructivism-founded scientific paradigm for organization research founded on 
the TCEP, the model of the design sciences, and the constructivist scholars’ shared beliefs 
(Mir and Watson 2000), knowledge is elaborated with an explicit intention of being useful for 
organizational design. From this point on, this paradigm will be labeled as a constructivist 
view  of  organizational  design  science.  The  rest  of  the  paper  will  examine  the  issues  of 
generation and use of knowledge about organizations in this particular view of organization 
science  in  order  to  take  advantage  of  what  is  already  known  about  these  issues  in 
organizational design science.  
 
Generation  and  Use  of  Knowledge  in  the  Constructivist  View  of 
Organizational Design Science 
In  organizational  design  science,  the  goal  of  research  is  to  develop  content  and 
methodological knowledge to guide design processes (Mohrman 2007), i.e. knowledge which 
advances understanding of the functioning and the evolution of organizations and is intended 
to  be  useful  for  the  design  and  implementation  of  organizational  artifacts  having  desired 
properties, such as managerial processes, procedures and systems. The two specific properties 
of  artifacts  underscored  by  Simon,  namely  goal-directedness  and  dependency  upon  their 
environment, call for in-depth field research to study them. Since the primary outcome of 
such research is local knowledge (Geertz 1983), doing research in the constructivist view of 
organizational  design  science  confronts  researchers  with  the  issues  of  generalizing  local 
knowledge and justifying generalization. The following sections successively address these 
issues  and  then  discuss  actual  use  of  knowledge  generated  in  the  constructivist  view  of 
organizational design science. 
Scientific Knowledge Generation as Elaboration of Generic Knowledge  
The  question  of  generalizing  local  knowledge  developed  in  field  research  has  long 
received attention from scholars utilizing the grounded theory method (Glaser and Strauss 
1967; Charmaz 2003, 2006). Even though Glaser and Strauss’ positions were imbued with 
positivism, drawing upon this method in a constructivist epistemology no longer comes as a 
surprise after Charmaz’ (2003, 2006) important contributions to this method. Besides, for 
Glaser  and  Strauss,  grounded  sociological  theory  must  be  useful  in  the  theoretical 










































that: “Theory (…) must fit the situation being researched, and work when put into use. By 
‘fit’ we mean that the categories must be readily (not forcibly) applicable to and indicated by 
the data under study; by ‘work’ we mean that they must be meaningfully relevant to and be 
able to explain the behavior under study.” (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 3) This normative view 
of sociological theory resembles what could be considered a theory in the constructivist view 
of organizational design science. Indeed, its criteria are not “truth” and “true explanation” as 
in positivist and critical realist paradigms, but “fit” and “work”, which have close similarity 
with Glasersfeld’s (2001) criterion of “functional fit” for evaluating knowledge in the TCEP.  
In  (Avenier  2009a,  2009b)  it  is  advocated  that  in  the  TCEP,  generalization  of  local 
knowledge follows a path similar to that suggested by Glaser and Strauss for going from 
substantive to formal grounded theory. Such generalization aims at upwardly extending the 
conceptual generality of local substantive knowledge by transcending the singularities of that 
knowledge  and  by  setting  forth  meta-relationships  that  this  local  knowledge  possibly 
instantiates. This extension is accomplished through a process of conceptualization and de-
contextualization  of  local  substantive  knowledge  via  the  systematic  study  of  multiple 
comparison groups and substantive theories (Charmaz 2003, 2006). Since the phrase “formal 
theory”  often  has  the  connotation  of  a  theory  built  by  logical  deduction  from  a  priori 
assumptions and expressed in mathematical formalism, I prefer using the term “generic” to 
designate  knowledge  having  a  certain  level  of  conceptual  generality.  This  term  has  been 
chosen  in  reference  to  the  notion  of  “generic  proposition”  developed  by  the  pragmatist 
philosopher Dewey (1938). Interestingly, this term also appears in Charmaz’ (2006) definition 
of a  formal (grounded)  theory. Besides, the notion of “generic knowledge” benefits from 
having recently been taken up by researchers from various cognitive sciences (Carlson and 
Pelletier 1995; Prasada 2000) engaged in investigating pending epistemic questions that this 
notion raises. For illustration purposes, Appendix A offers an example of generic knowledge 
elaborated in a research project on strategizing in financial brokerage companies (Gialdini 
2008). 
The construction of generic knowledge usually implies multiple iterations and back and 
forth  connections  of  the  information  gathered,  the local  knowledge  on  which  it  is based, 
published knowledge, conjectures made by the researcher, going back to the field in order to 
collect further information and returning to academic literature to clarify emerging notions. 
This process is fairly similar to that described by Pawson and Tilley (1997) for uncovering 
“underlying generative mechanisms” in design sciences. These mechanisms can be considered 
as generic knowledge of a particular type, that of technological rules which can be anchored 
on knowledge from the sciences of nature. Such a rule is defined as a chunk of general—in 
the sense of generic—knowledge linking an intervention or artifact with a desired outcome in 
a certain application-domain (Van Aken 2004).  
To  sum  up,  generic  knowledge  can  take  the  form  of  a  set  of  consistent  generic 
propositions such as those shown in Appendix A. It can also be expressed as “design rules” 
and “construction principles” (Romme and Damen 2007), design methods (Mohrman 2007), 
as  well  as  “knowledge  artifacts”  (Jarzabkowski  and  Wilson  2006),  such  as  frameworks, 
generic models, and tools, as, for instance, Porter’s five forces and generic strategy models.  
Knowledge Legitimization 
In the TCEP, the word legitimization is used to refer to the justification of the legitimacy 
of the knowledge being elaborated (Le Moigne 1995). In the design sciences, legitimization 
has  two  interconnected  facets:  epistemic  and  pragmatic  legitimization.  Epistemic 
legitimization  concerns  the  justification  of  the  epistemic  value  of  a  particular  piece  of 










































design processes (Mohrman 2007). This section focuses on epistemic legitimization in the 
constructivist view of organizational design science.  
The question of how to establish the validity of a theory has long been settled in positivist 
and  critical  realist  epistemologies:  an  assertion  or  a  theory  is  considered  as provisionally 
representative, as long as it is falsifiable and has withstood all hypotheses testing performed 
on  it  (Popper  1968).  Piaget  (1967)  offered  some  fundamental  ideas  on  knowledge 
legitimization in constructivist epistemologies. His ideas stemmed from reflections based on a 
vast  interdisciplinary  review  of  the  main  epistemological  schools  of  thought  concerning 
mathematics, physics, biology and human sciences realized under his direction. This led him 
to point out that since the mid-twentieth century epistemological reflection has increasingly 
arisen from within the sciences themselves. By becoming a reflection carried out by scientists 
themselves on the foundations of their own discipline, retroactive critique of the concepts, 
methods  and  principles  used  in  the  elaboration  of  knowledge  becomes  an  instrument  of 
scientific progress. Hence, in his view, this novel practice seemed likely to become rapidly 
accepted as a regular practice in all sciences. Later calls for epistemological reflection in 
organization studies by Burrell and Morgan (1979) echoed what Piaget (1967) perceived as 
having started earlier in other scientific fields. Finally, in the ‘90s, a number of organization 
scholars  did  become  reflective,  not  only  about  their  methodology,  but  also  about  the 
epistemological  paradigm  within  which  they  were  conducting  their  research  (Guba  and 
Lincoln  1989;  Martinet  1990;  Le  Moigne  1990;  Miles  and  Huberman  1994;  Denzin  and 
Lincoln 1998).  
Epistemic Legitimization: Based on Epistemic and Empirical Work 
At  the  same  time  that  reflectivity  developed  in  organization  research,  another  notion 
started  to  diffuse  in  constructivist  research,  that  of  reflexivity.  Sometimes  reflexivity 
designates an overall scholarly attitude of awareness of the role of the self in the various 
phases of a research project (Weick 1999; Charmaz 2006; Schwartz-Shea 2006), whereas 
reflectivity refers more broadly to a practice which consists of regularly stepping back to 
reflect critically on the work that has been done and on the prior understandings and theory-
in-action which have been implicit in the way it has been done (Schön 1983). Sometimes the 
terms are used interchangeably, which generates ambiguity. 
To  avoid  perpetuating  this  ambiguity,  what  Piaget  refers  to  under  the  name  of 
epistemological  critique,  essentially  epistemological  reflectivity,  will  be  labeled  here 
epistemic work. This has both drawbacks and advantages. Its main advantage is to emphasize 
that epistemic legitimization in the TCEP rests on work that has two interdependent facets—
the  epistemic  and  empirical  facets—which  need  to  be  mutually  adapted  to  fit  each  other 
throughout the research project. Its main drawback is that this notion of epistemic work is 
different from the way Cook and Brown (1999) use this phrase. For these authors, epistemic 
work comes from human action itself, making it largely implicit. Here, as exemplified in 
Appendix  B,  epistemic work  is  deliberate,  reflective  work:  digging  into both  the  implicit 
assumptions made and the deep meaning of the notions that are used; tracking what seems 
self-evident; questioning the mutual relevance and consistency of the countless decisions the 
researcher makes along the entire research process, from the specification of the research 
design to the communication of the results in order to adapt them to the meaning systems and 
contexts of each specific audience (Tenkasi et al. 2007).  
Since, in the TCEP, it is admitted that knowledge elaborated during a research project 
depends on the process of knowledge construction, knowledge legitimization in the TCEP 
primarily  relies  on  legitimizing  the  epistemic  and  empirical  work  performed  during 
knowledge construction. Three basic principles have been advocated for structuring this work, 
namely ethics, explicitness, and ostinato rigore (Le Moigne 1995, 2001, 2002). Since these 










































Legitimization’s Guiding Principles: Ethics, Explicitness, and Ostinato Rigore 
Concerning ethics, Wicks and Freeman (1998) argue that ethical considerations form an 
essential part of the very foundation of organization research and must be built into the “fabric 
of organization studies”. Since organization research deals with human beings, researchers 
have to interact with those humans in a manner respectful of their dignity, their integrity, and 
their privacy (Guba and Lincoln 1989). In the TCEP, this goes well beyond the classical 
canons, which bear on deception, confidentiality and fully informed consent. For instance, the 
TCEP’s agnostic character implies that no one can claim to have the single best representation 
of the phenomenon under study. This leads to interviewing all practitioners having experience 
concerning the phenomenon under study on an equal footing, regardless of their function in 
the organization—including those practitioners traditionally left aside as voiceless. 
Explicitness (Le Moigne 1995; Simon 1996) is directly related to criteria for evaluating 
qualitative  research  that  are  almost  ubiquitous  in the  literature,  such  as  thick  description, 
reflexivity, audit, and trustworthiness (Schwartz-Shea 2006). Indeed, thick description refers 
to the presence, in the research narrative, of sufficient detail about an event, setting, person, or 
interaction  to  capture  context-specific  nuances  of  meaning.  Striving  for  explicitness  also 
engages the researcher in a process of elicitation of the role of the self in the various phases of 
a research project, i.e. in reflexivity. The term audit is often used to denote a set of practices 
for documenting study procedures. An “audit trail” (Balogun et al. 2003) records, as precisely 
as possible, the various steps of the research.  The goal of the audit trail is to render as explicit 
as possible the linkages between researcher decisions, information gathered, and inferences 
drawn. The principle of explicitness extends the usual scope of  audits to formulating the 
founding assumptions of the epistemological paradigm in which the research has been carried 
out,  as  well  as  the  possible  ontological  working  assumptions  made.  Offering  a  detailed 
research report based on an extended audit trail provides a way to comply with the principle 
of explicitness. Such a report aims at providing sufficient grounding for the knowledge claims 
so that readers can form autonomous assessments of the knowledge generation process and 
check  whether  they  agree  with  the  knowledge  claims.  In  other  words,  the  report  aims  at 
building the credibility of knowledge claims (Charmaz 2006). Since trustworthiness refers to 
the many steps that a researcher takes throughout the research process to make their efforts 
self-consciously deliberate, transparent, and ethical (Schwartz-Shea 2006), explicitness plays 
a central role in building trustworthiness.  
The  term  trustworthiness  is  increasingly  used  in  interpretive  research  as  the  baseline 
standard  in  lieu  of  rigor  because  of  the  relatively  narrow  connotation  that  rigor  has  in 
conventional  organization  science  (Gulati  2007;  Kieser  and  Leiner  2009).  There  it  refers 
primarily to combating possible threats to reliability, and internal and external validity—as 
these notions are defined in positivist and realist epistemologies. Since the term is widely used 
in a much broader sense in sciences, along with Le Moigne (1995), I suggest not abandoning 
it, but rather using it in the sense of ostinato rigore, the favored motto of the emblematic 
design science practicing scholar Leornardo da Vinci. Indeed, this phrase accurately conveys 
the idea of an obstinate quest for becoming still more rigorous in the way researchers collect 
information, read and reread academic literature and field documents, and draw inferences. 
Hence, in the constructivist view of organizational design science the notion of rigor is richer 
than in the conventional view of organization science. Since the knowledge developed in 
organizational design science is also intended to be useful for design purposes (Mohrman 
2007) rigor and relevance can be reconciled in this view of organization science, while these 
characteristics have been argued to exclude one another in the classical view of organization 
science (Kieser and Leiner 2009). 
Triangulation, negative case analysis, and member checks, which are among the most 










































particularly useful in the tenacious search for rigor associated with ostinato rigore.  Since 
these techniques are already well-known, I will simply note that negative case analysis is not 
conceived as a Popperian falsification attempt. Rather, it is designed to prevent researchers 
from settling too quickly on a particular interpretation: researchers consciously search for any 
evidence that would throw into doubt their initial impressions and interpretations.  
So, overall, the three basic principles of ethics, explicitness and ostinato rigore mirror and 
extend the major evaluative criteria advocated in textbooks about qualitative research, namely 
credibility, trustworthiness, reflexivity, and thick description. Techniques depicted in these 
books for conducting high quality research, such as triangulation, audit, and member checks, 
also offer important means for operationalizing the principles of legitimization discussed here. 
These principles are also interdependent with one another: for instance, ethics are needed to 
produce rigorous explicitness, while explicitness is needed for showing signs of the ethics and 
rigor with which a particular research project has been conducted. 
When credibility  (Charmaz 2006), trustworthiness (Schwartz-Shea 2006), or, as is the 
case here, knowledge’s epistemic legitimacy is acknowledged, this knowledge can be built 
upon  in  subsequent  research  projects.  In  the  constructivist  view  of  organizational  design 
science, this knowledge also aims at being useful for organizational design. So, if certain 
practitioners do consider this knowledge as relevant and potentially useful for their concerns, 
it can be put into use, which would contribute to its pragmatic legitimization. So, the next 
question to examine is: in the constructivist view of organizational design science, what does 
putting knowledge into use mean?  
Use of Knowledge: Activation Rather than Application 
Putting  the  knowledge  elaborated  in  research  projects  into  practical  use  for  design 
purposes is a main goal of knowledge generation in organizational design science, as well as a 
means to enhance its pragmatic legitimization via putting it to the test of actual experience in 
various settings. Because of the founding assumptions of the TCEP, when put into use, any 
available knowledge, regardless of the epistemological paradigm in which it has been initially 
developed, is to be considered as a heuristic guide having several possible roles. These are 
essentially: to arouse scholar and practitioner reflection, to provide them with enlightening 
viewpoints  of  the  problem  at  hand,  and  to  stimulate  their  creativity  in  designing  their 
action(s). 
Generic knowledge cannot be applied as such. It needs to be contextualized/localized and 
interpreted  according  to practitioners’  intended  use  and  to  the  specifics  of  each  setting—
which is consistent with the context- and goal-dependency of phenomena that sciences of the 
artificial deal with (Simon 1969). Because of the complexity of contextualization, instead of 
speaking of knowledge application, some authors speak of knowledge put to action, put into 
use, or activation (Tenkasi et al. 2007). The term activation has the advantage of being more 
precise. Sometimes knowledge activation does not lead to any other action than the cognitive 
action of attempting to integrate it into one’s thought process as a means to reflect or gain 
insight on a problematic situation. Knowledge activation can permit the appropriation of this 
knowledge,  i.e.  the  integration  of  this  knowledge  into  the  individual’s  global  knowledge 
enabling its subsequent reactivation as in Simon’s view of problem-resolution recalled in Box 
1.  
The intentional use of knowledge, as for instance in ceremonial use, might not correspond 
to the purpose for which that knowledge has been developed in the first place (Jarzabkowski 
2004; Jarzabkowski and Giulietti 2007). Even when both intentional use and initial purpose 
match, contextualization involves a complex process implying reflection and re-interpretation 










































process leads to instantiations and meanings that can be quite different across different local 
contexts, and may even induce modifications to the knowledge’s initial meaning (Whittington 
2003; Jarzabkowski and Wilson 2006; Tenkasi et al. 2007). 
This phenomenon can be illustrated in an example taken up by Jarzabkowski and Wilson 
(2006) from (Chesley and Wenger 1999). This example shows how a tool designed to assess 
firm  performance,  the  balanced  scorecard  model,  was  adapted  to  suit  the  organizational 
context of a public agency, which is not concerned with making profit but with meeting a 
budget. These adaptations initiated a series of recursive processes in the organization. In the 
end,  the  balanced  scorecard  that  was  actually  implemented  held  little  resemblance  to  its 
original format and content. Yet, it was operating and had facilitated strategic conversations 
across levels and divisions. This process had created strong commitment to change since the 
constant re-visiting and modifications made to the framework encouraged strong levels of 
buy-in from staff. This case illustrates a way to use a generic framework as a heuristic guide. 
As  for  Jarzabkowski  and  Wilson  (2006),  the  dissociation  process  from  the  framework’s 
theoretical foundations is not viewed as a failing of practice. Rather it is viewed as a practical 
activation of generic knowledge that may be valuable not only for the organization but also 
for enriching the understanding of researchers who study it.  
Knowledge  activation  in  a  particular  setting  calls  for  empirical  work  aiming  at 
understanding  the  specific  circumstances  of  the  setting,  as  well  as  epistemic  work  for 
investigating the legitimacy of activating this knowledge in that setting, given its idiosyncratic 
circumstances.  In  this  regard,  contextualization  can  be  facilitated  by,  but  not  solely 
accomplished by researchers, even those acquainted with the setting, because it demands local 
sense making and self-design (Tenkasi et al. 2007). 
 
Discussion  
The discussion will focus on how bringing together organizational design science and 
constructivist shared beliefs as the main ingredients of a scientific paradigm for organization 
research  anchored  in  the  teleological  constructivist  epistemological  paradigm  may  affect 
constructivist research as well as research conducted in organizational design science. The 
potential advantages and drawbacks for organizational design science research of deliberately 
relying on teleological constructivist epistemological foundations will be examined first. Then 
the  potential  advantages  and  drawbacks  for  constructivist  research  of  subscribing  to  the 
framework of organizational design science will be explored. 
Since  any  scientific  endeavor  needs  to  be  explicit  concerning  the  epistemological 
paradigm within which the knowledge elaborated will be justified, scholars in organizational 
design science need to be explicit about the epistemological foundations of their research. So 
far, organizational design science’s advances have mainly focused on theory and methods 
(van Aken 2004; JABS 2007; OS 2008; MISQ 2008). Limited attention has been given to the 
epistemological  paradigm  in  which  these  advances  could  beneficially  develop,  although 
certain scholars (Romme 2003; Jelinek et al. 2008) have explicitly formulated their desire for 
a  design  science  which  could  enable  the  integration  of  knowledge  developed  in  key 
epistemological traditions in organization research.  
While I cannot see any particular disadvantage to rooting organizational design science in 
the  TCEP  rather  than  in  any  another  epistemological  paradigm,  I  do  perceive  significant 
advantages. Those stem from important properties of the TCEP, which have been discussed in 
this paper. As seen above, one advantage is the specific possibility of thoughtfully integrating 










































positivist or critical realist epistemological paradigms. Another advantage is the eligibility of 
any  research method  and/or technique  for  generating  and legitimizing knowledge.  Indeed, 
provided that the epistemic and empirical work are conducted with ethics, ostinato rigore, and 
explicitness, as defined earlier, knowledge legitimization does not require further hypothesis 
testing  or  replication  across  large  samples,  as  is  the  case  in  positivist  and  critical  realist 
paradigms. Hence, all the interactive methods such as action research (Argyris 1993; Eikeland 
2006),  intervention-research  (Hatchuel  2001),  collaborative  research  (Bartunek  and  Louis 
1996; Balogun et al. 2003), grounded theory method (Charmaz 2003; 2006), and engaged 
research (Van de Ven and Johnson 2006) are eligible for elaborating legitimized knowledge. 
These  methods  are  increasingly  advocated  and  practiced  because,  beyond  their  being 
particularly adapted to developing knowledge capable of being relevant for practice, they also 
enable the cross-fertilization of knowledge generation and use of that knowledge (Avenier 
2009b; Avenier and Gialdini 2009).  
What are the potential advantages and disadvantages for constructivist research of being 
explicitly  carried  out  within  the  organizational  design  science  framework?  High-quality 
research carried out in a constructivist epistemological paradigm—i.e. research satisfying the 
principles of ethics, ostinato rigore and explicitness—which aims at elaborating knowledge 
about organizations with a certain level of conceptual generality, can be viewed as a scientific 
endeavor within the wider framework of the sciences of the artificial. When the knowledge is 
elaborated with the further intention of being useful for organizational design purposes, the 
research  can  be  considered  as  a  scientific  endeavor  within  the  constructivist  view  of 
organizational design science. In my view, acquiring an explicitly scientific status can be a 
significant advantage for constructivist research. What are the drawbacks? I can see three 
possible sorts. 
One  comes  from  the  explicitness  requirement  of  high-quality  research.  This  demands 
rendering  explicit  a  number  of  assumptions  usually  left  implicit  such  as  the  ontological 
working assumptions possibly made in the project under consideration. This also demands 
strong  attention  to  a  distinction  often  overlooked  in  constructivist  discourse  because  one 
particular term, reality, is used to refer to two notions which are considered as distinct in the 
teleological constructivist epistemological paradigm. These notions are, on the one hand, the 
world as possibly is, which is also called reality in the TCEP; and, on the other hand, human 
experience  and  representation  of  that  world.  Not  distinguishing  between  these  notions  in 
constructivist research generates lots of confusion.   
Another possible drawback stems from the constraint imposed by the framework of the 
sciences of the artificial on the aim of research projects, namely that of elaborating knowledge 
with a certain level of conceptual generality. This may be considered by some constructivist 
and interpretive scholars as being at odds with the goal of their research that is conducted 
without  an  explicit  intention  of  generalization.  Do,  however,  the  contributions  which  are 
published out of such studies solely offer juxtaposed local interpretations? Doesn’t conceptual 
generality, i.e. generic knowledge, emerge from the research process even when it is not an 
explicit goal (Charmaz 2006)? What has been presented above as potential drawbacks for 
constructivist research manifest, in fact, as further efforts required to render the research still 
more rigorous and its broader results even more explicit. Rather than imposing unnecessary 
constraints, it encourages research to be of yet higher quality. 
Specifically subscribing to the framework of organizational design science generates a 
further constraint: the knowledge needs to be elaborated with the explicit intention of being 
useful for organizational design purposes. Certain constructivist scholars may consider this 
requirement  as  going  against  their  humanistic  values—although  they  cannot  prevent  the 
results of their studies being used at a later date by others for organizational design purposes, 










































constraint may limit the attractiveness of the organizational design science framework, and 
reveals the potential value of developing a conceptualization of organization science based on 
the wider framework of the sciences of the artificial, which does not require that knowledge 
be developed with the explicit aim of being useful for design purposes.  
 
Conclusion 
This  article  has  highlighted  that  constructivist  epistemology  and  organizational  design 
science can beneficially be combined to constitute the beginnings of a constructivism-founded 
scientific paradigm for organization research. It has also addressed the issues of generation of 
scientific knowledge about organizations in this constructivist view of organizational design 
science, and of actual use of this knowledge. It has argued that grounded theory methods are a 
potentially  fertile  but  not  exclusive  way  of  doing  research  in  this  paradigm.  Indeed,  any 
method can be used to generate and legitimize knowledge provided it is carried out with 
ethics, ostinato rigore and explicitness. 
This  paper  has  also  pointed  out  that  this  constructivist  view  of  organizational  design 
science provides a framework enabling the legitimization of knowledge which is constructed 
in an explicitly ethical and rigorous manner within research projects that interactively involve 
researchers  and  practitioners.  More  fundamentally  this  framework  permits  researchers  to 
overcome  numerous  long-lasting  problematic  dichotomies  in  conventional  organization 
science (Tsoukas 2005; Jarzabkowski 2005) such as that between rigor and relevance, and 
that between generation and use of academic knowledge about organizations. The potential 
this framework offers for bypassing dichotomies comes from the founding assumption shared 
by constructivist epistemologies which postulates that the inquirer and the inquired into, while 
distinct, cannot be dissociated in the knowledge process. This founding assumption leads to a 
number of interactionist assumptions shared by constructivist scholars. 
In addition, the recognition of the sciences of the artificial (Simon 1969) as a legitimate 
developing  archetype  of  science permits  overcoming the  dualism between  “sciences”  and 
“applied  sciences”  that  has  been  particularly  denounced  by  Simon  (1969),  Beyer  (1982), 
Schön (1983), and Le Moigne (1990, 2001). As underscored by Van Gigch (2002) and Van 
Aken (2004), this dualism leads to viewing organization science  as an “applied science”, 
meaning  that  researchers  in  organization  science  are  supposed  to  confine  themselves  to 
applying knowledge developed in other sciences that are considered as more fundamental. 
Overcoming this dualism can be achieved by conceiving of science not as a monolithic unity 
but as a unitas multiplex (Morin 1992), i.e. as a unity made of parts that are diverse and may 
interact without loosing their identity. In this view, the sciences of the artificial are considered 
as  sciences  neither  less,  nor  more,  fundamental  than  the  sciences  of  nature.  These  two 
archetypes  of  sciences  appear  complementary  since  they  study  two  different  kinds  of 
phenomena: phenomena perceived as natural, i.e. considered as independent of intentional 
human  actions,  in  the  sciences  of  nature;  and  artifacts,  i.e.  phenomena  perceived  to  be 
influenced by human intentional actions, in the sciences of the artificial. Since artifacts are 
viewed as possibly embodying natural phenomena while being embedded in nature, these two 
types of sciences appear not only as complementary, but also as partners (Van Aken 2004). 
Last  but  not  least,  just  as  non-Euclidean  geometry  includes  Euclidean  geometry  as  a 
special  case  (Bachelard  1934;  Guba  and  Lincoln  1989)  and  modern  physics  includes 
Newtonian  physics  (Kuhn  1970),  because  of  the  agnostic  character  of  the  teleological 
constructivist  epistemological  paradigm  and  the  status  conferred  to  knowledge  in  this 
epistemological paradigm, knowledge elaborated in this constructivist view of organizational 
design  science  can  incorporate  knowledge  developed  in  other  epistemological  paradigms, 










































of organizational design science becomes a widely recognized, alternative scientific paradigm 
for organization science, this paradigm’s integrative capability will not make this recognition 
appear to be the outcome of a paradigm war. Rather, it will make it appear more positively 
and fruitfully as an interim output of a process of paradigmatic expansion that is fed by the 
very  achievements  and  conceptualizations  that  this  constructivist  view  of  organizational 
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Appendix  A:  Generic  Knowledge  Developed  in  the  Study  of  Strategizing  in  Financial 
Brokerage Companies by Gialdini (2008). 
“In financial brokerage activities, legitimacy matters are at the core of strategizing.  
Legitimacy  is  considered  as  a  justification  which  evolves  over  time  and  context 
(Habermas 1975).  
The  existence  of  brokerage  companies  is  conditioned  by  their  reputation  and  their 
expertise. The legitimacy of brokerage companies is based on the sense that brokers and their 
clients give to brokerage companies and brokers’ activity. Hence, the notion of legitimacy 
permits to link the three dimensions of strategizing. 
With Jarzabkowski (2005), the strategy building process in brokerage is considered as 
integrating  both  the “interactive  strategizing/interpretative  legitimacy”  pair  and  that  of 
“procedural strategizing/structural legitimacy”. The first pair is built by different interactions 
that support change in strategy (Weick and Robert 1993). The second one is based on existing 
routines and controls which reinforce strategy already in place (Giddens 1984). The first has 
primacy  when  there  is  environmental  stability,  the  second  when  there  are  environmental 











































Appendix B: Epistemic Work Performed in the Study of Strategizing in Financial Brokerage 
Companies by Gialdini (2008). 
 
In  an  interview  with  Laurence  Gialdini  she  recounted  how  the  view  expressed  in 
Appendix1,  of  the  central  role  played  by  legitimacy  matters  in  strategizing  in  financial 
brokerage companies, emerged and was progressively justified through epistemic work. This 
view initially emerged from interactions with practitioners, was reinforced by interactions 
with scholars, and then theoretically grounded by going back to the literature. 
The epistemic work that she performed can briefly be summarized as follows. A detailed 
study  of  practitioners’  interviews  suggested  that  the  existence  of  brokerage  companies  is 
conditioned by several attributes such as their reputation, expertise, and power. Further close 
reading  of  all  the  interviews  led  Gialdini  to  perceive  that  the  notion  of  legitimacy 
systematically  underlay  the  notions  that  condition  the  existence  of  brokerage  companies. 
Later, in the activation of Jarzabkowski’s (2005) activity-based model in the financial field, it 
seemed  that  the  notion  of  legitimacy  permitted  connecting  the  three  aspects  of  Practice, 
practices and practitioners’ role, through their mutual justification. Discussion of this view 
with other scholars reassured her about the relevance of this perspective for understanding 
strategizing  in  financial  brokerage  and  incited  her  to  go  back  to  neo-institutional  theory 
(DiMaggio  and  Powell  1983;  Scott  2001)  and  to  the  literature  about  legitimacy,  with 
particular focus on Habermas (1975). These readings reinforced her view of legitimacy in 
financial brokerage as a justification process which depends on time and context.  
She refined the links between legitimacy, strategizing and processes by building upon 
Jarzabkowski’s  (2005)  view  of  the  strategy  building  process  as  integrating  both  the 
“interactive  strategizing/interpretative  legitimacy”  pair  and  that  of  “procedural 
strategizing/structural  legitimacy”.  The  first  pair  was  connected  to  Weick  and  Roberts’ 
(1993) study on change supported by interactions, and the second to Giddens’ (1984) view 
that existing routines and controls reinforce the continuity of what is practiced. Finally, the 
statement  that  legitimacy  matters  are  at  the  core  of  strategizing  in  financial  brokerage 
activities was derived from the activation of Jarzabkowski’s activity-based model in the case 










































Table 1: Core Founding Assumptions of the Two Constructivist Epistemological Paradigms  
  
 
Nature of questioning  
Teleological Constructivist Epistemological Paradigm   
(Glasersfeld 2001;  Le Moigne 1995, 2001, 2002; Riegler 2001) 
Guba and Lincoln’s Constructivist 
Epistemological Paradigm (Guba and 
Lincoln 1989, 1998) 
Ontological 
What is there to be 
known? 
What is the nature of 
reality? 
The existence of an objective world populated by mind-independent entities is 
neither denied nor asserted. 
 
Phenomenology’s basic assumption: 
Humans cannot rationally know such a thing as an independent, objective world 
that stands apart from their experience of it. Human experience is knowable. 
Because of the phenomenological assumption, no founding assumption on the 
nature of reality is made. 
Relativist ontology assumption:   
There exist multiple socially constructed 
realities not governed by any natural laws, 
causal or otherwise. 
Epistemological  
 
What can be known?  
 
What is the relationship 
of the knower to the 




 How can we be sure that 
we know what we believe 
we know? 
The inquirer cannot be separated from the inquired-into in the knowledge process. 
The elaboration of knowledge is portrayed as a process of intentional elaboration 
of symbolic constructions, called representations, based on experience.  
The notion of “truth” is meaningless because of the unfeasibility of determining if 
representations are similar, or not similar, to the world that has induced the 
experience.  
To know is not to possess true representations of reality, but to possess ways and 
means of acting and thinking that allow one to attain the goals one happens to have 
chosen. 
The role of knowledge construction shifts from constructing (supposedly) true 
representations to functionally fitted representations. 
The knowledge elaborated is context and goal-dependent. It may induce 
modifications in the prior knowledge that served to build it.  
The inquirer cannot be separated from the 
inquired-into in the knowledge process.  
 
 
“Truth” is defined as the best informed and most 





Theory is viewed as an act of generation, rather 
than the formalization of an underlying reality. 
Methodological  
What are the ways of 
elaborating knowledge? 
 
Any method, including hermeneutical dialectical methods, is eligible.  
Criteria: explicitness, rigor, ethics 
 
Only hermeneutical dialectical methods of 
inquiry are eligible. 











































Table 2: Main Beliefs Shared by Constructivist Scholars According to Mir and Watson (2000) 
 
 
Belief  B1  Knowledge  is  theory  driven:  researchers  approach  a  problematic  situation  with  a 
preconceived  notion  about  the  nature  of  the  problem.  As  long  as  researchers  are 
transparent  about their a priori theoretical  position,  the  process of research is  not 
impeded.  Constructivists  oppose  a  nomothetic  approach  which  assumes  that 
researchers are essentially discoverers of ‘natural’ phenomena and that adherence to 
systematic protocol and technique will eliminate all biases from the research process. 
Belief  B2  Even though the researcher and the phenomena under investigation are viewed as 
distinct,  their  separation  is  considered  not  feasible  in  the  following  sense:  the 
philosophical positions held by researchers determine their findings. Organizational 
‘reality’ (Astley 1985) and the truth that academic disciplines avow (Cannella and 
Paetzold 1994) are socially constructed.  
Belief  B3  Constructivists believe that theory and practice are fundamentally interlinked. Pre-
theoretical praxis leads to the formalization of theory, which ultimately guides future 
praxis. Researchers are actors rather than mere information processors or reactors. 
They do not merely observe organizational structures and report their findings. They 
also play a role in the process determining which structures are more or less likely to 
be adopted. 
Belief  B4  Researchers  cannot  be  objective  or  value-neutral.  Constructivists  subscribe  to  the 
view  that  theory  is  discursive  and  power-laden.  They  suggest  that  theories  are 
transmitted across space and time through discursive practices. Institutions are the 
sites where discourses produce communities of agreement. 
Belief  B5  Research occurs within a community of scholarship where mutually held assumptions 
are  deployed  to  create  conversations.  Latour  and  Woolgar  (1989)  show  that  “the 
construction of scientific facts, in particular, is a process of generating texts whose 
fate depends on their subsequent interpretation”. (p. 273) 
Belief  B6  Constructivism has been conceptualized as a methodology, which is distinct from a 
method.  A  methodology  may  be  regarded  as  an  intricate  set  of  ontological  and 
epistemological assumptions that a researcher brings to his or her work. Researchers 
need to be explicit about their choice of methodology. A researcher who is anchored 












































Table 3: Examples of Associations between Scientific Archetypes and Epistemological 
Paradigms in the Academic Literature 





Sciences of Nature Sciences of the Artificial 









Design sciences (Van Aken 2004, 
2005; Denyer and Tranfield 2006; 
Denyer et al. 2008;





Maturana’s (2000) works  
in biology
Sciences of design (Le Moigne 








Box 1: Examples of Central Notions in Simon’s Conceptualization of the Sciences of 
the Artificial 
 “Symbol systems are almost the quintessential artifacts, for adaptivity to an environment 
is their whole raison d’être.” (Simon 1969: 22).  
“Every  problem-solving  effort  must  begin  with  creating  a  representation  for  the 
problem—a problem space in which the search for the solution can take place. Of course, for 
most of the problems we encounter in our daily personal or professional lives, we simply 
retrieve  from memory a representation that we have already stored and used on previous 
occasions. (…) Occasionally, however, we encounter a situation that doesn’t seem to fit any 
of the problem spaces we have encountered before, even with some stretching and shaping. 
Then we are faced with a task of discovery that may be as formidable as finding a new natural 
law. Newton was able to discover the law of gravitation because he had previously found a 
new representation, differential calculus. More often, problems of representation arise that are 
mid-way  in  difficulty  between  simply  adapting  a  known  representation  and  inventing 
calculus.” (Simon 1996: 108-109, italics added) 
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